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Abstract—Increasingly Industrial Control Systems (ICS) systems
are being connected to the Internet to minimise the operational
costs and provide additional flexibility. These control systems
such as the ones used in power grids, manufacturing and
utilities operate continually and have long lifespans measured
in decades rather than years as in the case of IT systems.
Such industrial control systems require uninterrupted and safe
operation. However, they can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks,
as successful attacks on critical control infrastructures could have
devastating consequences to the safety of human lives as well as
a nations security and prosperity. Furthermore, there can be a
range of attacks that can target ICS and it is not easy to secure
these systems against all known attacks let alone unknown ones.
In this paper, we propose a software enabled security architecture
using Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function
Virtualisation (NFV) that can enhance the capability to secure
industrial control systems. We have designed such an SDN/NFV
enabled security architecture and developed a Control System
Security Application (CSSA) in SDN Controller for enhancing
security in ICS against certain specific attacks namely denial
of service attacks, from unpatched vulnerable control system
components and securing the communication flows from the
legacy devices that do not support any security functionality.
In this paper, we discuss the prototype implementation of the
proposed architecture and the results obtained from our analysis.
Index Terms—Control System Security, Software Defined Net-
working (SDN), Network Function Virtualisation, Security Ar-
chitecture, Security Attacks, .
I. INTRODUCTION
Control systems are usually composed of a set of networked
agents, consisting of: sensors, actuators, control processing
units, and communication devices. Control systems such as
electricity generation and supply, gas supply, logistics, man-
ufacturing and hospitals are considered critical national in-
frastructure. The operational technologies that support critical
infrastructure depend heavily on information systems for their
monitoring and control. Traditionally, physical separation of
ICS networks was used as primary means for securing critical
control systems.
Modern control system architectures, business requirements,
and cost control measures result in increasing integration of
corporate and ICS IT architectures. Physical separation alone
no longer provides a viable business option for managing,
utilizing, or securing ICS. The evolution of these systems
from isolated environments into internet connected ones,
in combination with their long service life and real-time
nature have raised severe security concerns in the event of a
cyber-attack. As a vital part of critical national infrastructure,
protecting ICS from cyber threats has become a high priority
since their compromise can result in a myriad of different
problems, from service disruptions and economical loss, to
jeopardising natural ecosystems and putting human lives at
risk. Stuxnet, Duqu, NotPetya, and more recently, WannaCry,
exemplify the devastating consequences this type of attack
may have on critical ICS infrastructures. Hence there is
urgent need for techniques that can be used to enhance the
security of the control systems from cybersecueity attacks.
The main aim of this paper to develop a software enabled
architecture for securing control systems from cyberattacks.
Our architecture uses software defined networks (SDN)
and network function virtualisation (NFV) based techniques
for enhancing security in control systems. SDN enables
programmable networks and provides separation of control
and data planes, enabling management protocols to be
separated from the data traffic. The control plane consists of
a logically centralised controller, which can be distributed
in practice, and has native applications for management
of network devices. Data plane consists of both physical
and virtual network devices and implement protocols for
forwarding traffic based on flow rules as well as protocols for
(e.g. OpenFlow) for communicating with the control plane.
NFV allows softwarisation of network functions enabling
the provision network services as Virtual Network Functions
(VNFs). Hence NFV enables the critical network operators to
deploy security services in a dynamic fashion.
Such a software enabled architecture enables secure dynamic
policy-based decision making which can be particularly
suitable for securing control systems. Control systems
are autonomous decision-making agents making real-time
decisions. Real time decision making requires the capability
to make dynamic decisions to ensure higher availability
of services which is an important requirement in control
systems. The software defined architecture proposed in this
paper is able to define fine grained flow-based security
ensuring the availability of critical control subsystems.
Another major challenge in control systems is the inability
to make updates to certain critical components which in turn
can make them vulnerable. The proposed architecture can
make such unpatched control components to be accessed in
a secure manner, only via secure flows from authorised users
and devices, thereby protecting from attacks. Furthermore,
traditionally control systems are designed to operate in
closed environments, which meant that often they do not
possess much (or any) security functionality. However, with
the increasing use of Internet protocols such as IP for
the management of control system components (such as
controllers), they are susceptible to various cyberattacks. The
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
15
27
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 J
un
 20
20
Control Plane (SDN Controller)
Control Layer
North Bound Interface (NBI)
Data Plane
Infrastructure Layer 
South Bound Interface (SBI)
Network Elements
Application Plane/ Layer
Network Services
Network Applications
Fig. 1: Software-Defined Network Architecture
proposed software enabled security architecture provides the
capability to secure the flows from these legacy devices that
do not support the required security functionalities.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents an
overview of the SDN architecture and the challenges and
requirements for enhancing security in control systems. In
Section III we propose software enabled security architecture
for control systems that is based on SDN and NFV technolo-
gies. We first present a high level overview of the CSSA and
then describe the important components of CSSA. We also
discuss the specific security functions that are invoked in the
switches to deal with the attacks from end hosts. In Section
IV we present some general discussion related to our software
architecture. In Section V we present the implementation of
CSSA and demonstrate its usage by considering an example
attack case scenario and how CSSA can help to detect such
attacks. Then we present some performance results. Section
VI considers some related work and Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. SDN OVERVIEW AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this Section, we provide an overview of the SDN Architec-
ture and discuss some of the requirements for securing control
systems from cybersecurity attacks.
A. SDN Overview:
The SDN is a new architecture that has been deployed
to enable more agile and cost-effective networks. It is an
architectural approach that optimizes and simplifies network
operations by more closely binding interactions such as provi-
sioning, messaging, and alarming among applications, network
services and devices, whether they be real or virtualized [1].
The key features of SDN are [1]:
• The separation of the network control plane (SDN Con-
troller) from the data plane (Southbound Interface).
• A logically centralized controller communicating with
the data plane over open and standardized interfaces and
protocols (OpenFlow).
• The control applications (Northbound Interface/Pro-
grammable API interface) running on top of the Con-
troller.
Figure 1 shows the SDN architecture proposed by Open
Networking Foundation [2]. The SDN architecture differs from
legacy solutions by building networks in three abstractions/-
planes/layers.
Data Plane/Infrastructure Layer. The Data Plane or In-
frastructure Layer acts as the foundation for an SDN ar-
chitecture. This plane consists of both physical and virtual
network devices such as switches, routers, wireless access
points. These devices implement the OpenFlow protocol
to maintain communication with the Control Plane and
also implement standard methods for forwarding traffic
using flow rules.
Control Plane/Layer. The Control Plane acts as the brain
for the whole networking ecosystem. The Control Plane is
decoupled from the underlying Data Plane infrastructure
to provide a single centralised view of the entire network.
The Control Plane utilises OpenFlow to communicate
with the Data Plane devices. The SDN Controller is a
logically separate entity responsible for receiving instruc-
tions from the application layer and enforcing them over
the Data Plane devices. It is also responsible for gathering
information about network devices, events and statistics
and sharing this data with the network applications run-
ning in the Application Plane.
Application Plane/Layer. The Application Plane consists of
network services, orchestration tools, and business appli-
cations that interact with the control layer. For instance,
an application to monitor malicious activity in Data Plane
devices. These applications leverage open interfaces to
communicate with the Control Plane and the network
state.
API interfaces. The application programming interfaces
(APIs) are an alternate way to provide the abstraction
necessary for SDN, along with a highly programmable
infrastructure. APIs provide a channel by which instruc-
tions can be sent to a device to program it. In SDN, APIs
are called “Northbound”or “Southbound”, depending on
where they function in the architecture. APIs that reside
on a Controller and are used by applications to send
instructions to the Controller are northbound because the
communication takes place north of the Controller. South-
bound APIs reside on network devices such as switches.
These are used by the SDN Controller to provision the
network, with the communication taking place south of
the Controller.
B. Security Requirements for Control Systems
• Control systems have higher availability requirements
compared to systems in enterprise networks. Control
systems are autonomous decision making agents which
need to make decisions in real time. While availability is
a well studied problem in information security, real-time
availability provides a stricter operational environment
than most traditional IT systems. Hence there is a need
for techniques that can make real time decisions for
higher availability of services in the control systems. The
number of connections that can be handled by the servers
depend on the application or hardware requirements. In
our model, the SDN Controller is used to limit the number
of flows to server depending on the server capacity. The
flow control can be enforced on a per flow, per device,
per domain or per location.
• The property of control systems that is most commonly
brought up as a distinction with IT security is that soft-
ware patching and frequent updates, are not well suited
for control systems. For example, upgrading a system
may require months of advance in planning of how to
take the system ofine; it is, therefore, economically difcult
to justify suspending the operation of an industrial com-
puter on a regular basis to install new security patches.
Some security patches may even violate the certication
of control systems. For instance, as discussed in [3], a
nuclear power plant was accidentally shutdown because
a computer used to monitor chemical and diagnostic
data from the plants business network rebooted after a
software update. When the computer rebooted, it reset
the data on the control system, causing safety systems to
incorrectly interpret the lack of data as a drop in water
reservoirs that cool the plants radioactive nuclear fuel
rods. Hence there is a need to ensure accessibility to
unpatched system while protecting it against the attacks.
In our approach, SDN is used to provide access to the
authorised users and the flows from the authorised devices
are protected against attacks.
• ICS protocols were initially designed to operate in closed
environments. Authentication and encryption of the com-
munication between the devices was not considered as
requirement during initial design. The lack of security
features in ICS protocols remained largely unnoticed due
to the deployment in isolated (trusted) environments. This
changed recently when ICS protocols have been stacked
onto IP, enabling the management of ICS controllers via
the global Internet. Such communication requires protec-
tive measures, either via secure tunnels between trusted
domains or end-to-end authentication and encryption.
Unencrypted ICS traffic is particularly dangerous since
it is prone to eavesdropping and manipulation attacks.
Hence there is a need for techniques for securing the
flows from the leagcy and resource constrained devices
that do not support any security functionality or protocols.
III. CONTROL SYSTEM SECURITY APPLICATION
In this section, we will first discuss some of the assumptions
and overview of our model. Then we describe the CSSA
logical architecture and specific security functions developed
for switches to deal with the attacks in control systems.
• We assume that the Controller in the SDN domain is not
compromised. This is a common assumption for security
models in SDN.
• We use the term end host to represent a client or server
or field device. We assume that end hosts are connected
using SDN switches. Hence any communication between
the end hosts pass through the switches.
• A flow is used to represent communication between the
end hosts. A flow can be a single packet or sequence of
packets between the end hosts.
A. Overview:
We consider a simple scenario as shown in Figure 2 where
the control station with different servers such as SCADA
server, HMI server, Historian server is used to monitor several
processes with various filed devices such as actuators, valves
and sensors in a control system. The enterprise network is also
connected to the control system network using the security
Fig. 2: Sample Scenario
Fig. 3: Control System Security Application Components
gateway. The field devices, servers in the control station and
the enterprise systems are interconnected using SDN switches
and the SDN controller is used for managing the complete
network.
Figure 3 shows the important component of the CSSA which
is designed to run as an application on SDN Controller. We
have used a modular approach in the design of CSSA and
NFV enables implementation of specific security functions
depending on the capability of switches. The CSSA is used
in the specification and evaluation of security polices for
managing all the network devices in a SDN based control
system domain. The SDN Controller has global knowledge of
all the devices in the network. Since the CSSA is implemented
on the SDN Controller, it is able to access the information
available in the Controller and use it for monitoring and
detecting the attacks from the end hosts. Now let us consider
the high level operation of the CSSA.
When the switches receive a new flow, they generate a
Packet in message to the SDN Controller which is subse-
quently forwarded to the CSSA. The CSSA retrieves the spe-
cific policies related to the flow and invokes specific security
related functions for establishing secure communication path
and monitoring the flows for attacks.
Such decisions include establishment of routes in the SDN
that meet the requirements of the end users/applications and
whether flow requests from the end hosts are to be permitted
according to the security policies as well as generation of keys
for establishing secure routes and communications between
the end hosts. We use OpenFlow protocol for communications
between the SDN Controller ad the switches. Also, we have
used XML for specification and communication of security
policies between the CSSA and the switches.
The main advantage of enforcing the security policies at the
switches is that the attack can be detected and prevented
nearest to the malicious end host (from where it comes from).
B. Control System Security Application
The CSSA has security policies for all network devices in a
given SDN based Control System domain. The CSSA enables
the security administrator(s) to specify policies based on differ-
ent parameters and conditions such as time, location, source,
destination, event and type of traffic. For instance, policies
can specify access to services during specific time intervals
and/or using certain devices from specific locations. Similarly
there can be different policies depending on the source address
and/or destination address. Also, there can be different policies
that can be triggered during different events. For instance,
when there is a legitimate increase in the traffic load, there
can be mechanisms to replicate the services on multiple servers
and distribute the load between them; during off-peak times,
when the traffic falls below the certain lower threshold, then
the services hosted on multiple servers can be contracted to a
few servers. However, if the increase in the load is caused
by an attack, then the policies will create mechanisms to
isolate the hosts that are generating the attack traffic. There can
also be security policies for different types of traffic allowing
secure end to end paths for sensitive communications between
the end hosts and field devices in sdn managed control system
domain.
The main components of the CSSA are: Policy Resolver,
Key Management, Enforcement module, Logging and Alert
Generation. Policy Resolver is used for storing the policies
related to the domain and determining the appropriate policies.
The Enforcement Module derives the mechanisms for enforc-
ing the policies determined by the Policy Resolver. The Key
Management module is used for generating keys for secure
communications. Logging module is used for logging all the
messages transferred between the Controller and the CSSA
and Alert Generation is used to raise alert to the Security
Administrator when attacks are detected in the control system
network.
The CSSA receives the packet in message from the SDN
Controller and forwards it to the Policy Resolver to determine
the related security policy. The Policy Resolver analyses the
packet in message (such as the source address and destination
address) and retrieves the related security policy from its
database and updates the CSSA with the related policy. The
Enforcement Module is used for enforcement of the policies
locally or dynamically invoking the specific functions at the
switches in the data plane. If a new security policy mandates
secure communications, then the CSSA requests the Key
Management module to generate keys for secure communi-
cation and distributes the key to the corresponding switches
(connected to the respective end hosts).The alert generation
component generates an alert to the security administrator
when attacks are detected in the control system network. The
administrator can conduct an offline analysis to determine
the seriousness of the event and decide to either isolate the
suspicious end host from the network or restrict the end host
communication depending on the availability requirements of
the end host.
C. Switch Security Functions
In this section we will describe the important security func-
tions that are implemented at the switches.
1) Logical Store(): This LS()function is used for storing
specific information about the end hosts which are useful for
detecting attacks. For instance, LS() is used to store attack
signatures, whitelists, blacklists, behaviour profiles of the end
hosts and audit records related to the incoming and outgoing
traffic from the end hosts.
2) Traffic Validation(): The TV() is used in the validation of
the traffic from all the end hosts connected to the switches.
It makes use of source address validation, signature and
anomaly based techniques for detecting attacks. Validating the
source address prevents an end host from injecting malicious
messages and generating attack traffic with spoofed identities.
The signature and anomaly based techniques are then used to
deal with the attacks that are generated with correct source
address.
We have developed software modules for implementing deep
packet inspection based validation in the OpenFlow switches.
The software modules analyse the payload and apply access
control mechanisms to drop the malicious packets. Access
control rule matching is done using Regular Expressions. GNU
C regex has been used for this purpose. As an Open vSwitch is
built mostly using C, it makes GNU C regex easily adaptable
to the environment. Comparison of the access control rule with
the payload information is achieved by storing the rules in
LS() and then developing a regular expression string for each
access rule. Then the created regex strings are compared with
the payload information. TV() accepts the access control rules
sent by the CSSA and stores them in an array. When a packet
flow occurs, the TV() pulls the corresponding access rules
and creates regex strings, which are then matched against the
packet payload. If a match is found, TV() drops the flow and
raises an alert to the CSSA.
The anomaly detection mechanisms use static thresholds at the
initial stages to prevent flooding attacks on critical services
in the control system. The threshold is determined by the
security administrator based on the critical server application,
OS and hardware used for the critical services. This thresholds
is used to validate the flow requests to the server in real time
and limit the flows based on different factors such as per
device, per switch, per domain and per location. Traffic logs
captured at LS() are used for training the TV() to capture the
network behaviour. As part of our future work, we will develop
machine learning for capturing the behaviour of the network
traffic and detecting attacks. The trained classifier is stored as
a baseline detector for matching the traffic behaviour. During
testing, TV() uses these pre-compiled profiles for validating
the behaviour of the end hosts and detecting the attacks.
3) Flow Encryption (): The FE component is used for secur-
ing the communications between the end hosts. If the flow
security policy mandates secure communication between the
end hosts, the key management module in the CSSA will
generate the required symmetric key for securing the flows
and distribute the key to the relevant switches.
In control systems there can be several legacy and resource
constrained devices that do not support any security functional-
ity or protocols. Hence, in these cases, security administrators
can make use of this FE() for securing the communication
between the hosts. If a new flow is destined to devices/hosts
that do not support security functionality, then the CSSA
can enforce policy to encrypt the flow at the switch that is
connected to the source host and decrypt the flow at the switch
that is connected to the destination host.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, we will discuss how our model can enhance
the security in control systems.
As the Controller has the visibility of its network domain
topology and devices, the CSSA uses this information to
make real time decisions on communication between the end
hosts based on their availability requirements. The traffic flows
initiated by the end hosts are subjected to security policies
in the CSSA in the SDN Controller of that domain. The
source host could be any client machine or field device. The
initial packet header from the source host is sent by the
switch (to which this host is connected) to the SDN Controller
which is subsequently forwarded to the CSSA. The header
contains all the usual network and service parameters such
as the source address, destination address the packet type.
The CSSA extracts the relevant parameters from the incoming
packets and uses the Policy Resolver to determine whether
the communication or flow is permitted according to the
policies configured by the security administrator. If the flow
is permitted by any of the polices, then the path is established
to enable communication between the end hosts. If the flow
is not permitted by any policy then the flow is dropped.
If the end hosts still continues to generate excessive flow
requests then an alert is raised to the security administrator.
This is a significant advantage as it helps to deal with attacks
such as outbreak of worms in critical control systems. For
instance, the Slammer worm which randomly scanned for
vulnerable machines for spreading the attack created severe
congestion in the network and as well as disabling safety
monitoring system in nuclear power plant for over five hours
[4]. Using the proposed architecture, CSSA drops all the
randomly generated malicious flow requests which do not
satisfy policies permitting the flows. As the malicious flows
are dropped at the source end, the impact on the bandwidth is
minimized. This can be significant in certain control systems.
Case 1: Now assume that there is a specific server providing
a critical service and consider how CSSA can help to achieve
higher availability for that critical service. Assume that some
end hosts in the control system are compromised by an attacker
and used to generate flooding attacks on the server that is host-
ing the critical service. Without the proposed architecture, the
attacker can flood the critical service severely impacting the
availability of the service. Using the proposed architecture, the
CSSA uses the network domain visibility to make decisions, in
real time, on communications between the end hosts based on
their availability requirements. If the critical server is capable
of handling x flows/sec, then the CSSA restricts the flows to
the critical server to less than x flows/sec. The dynamic policy
driven approach in the CSSA allows the flows to be restricted
based on a variety of parameters such as maximum number
of flows per end host, maximum number of flows per switch
and maximum number of flow per control process or logical
domain.
Case 2: Protecting unpatched server. In this case the flows
to the unpatched server can be permitted only from selective
hosts. Furthermore, all the flows from the permitted hosts can
be monitored for attack traffic and the malicious end hosts can
be isolated if they are attempting to exploit the vulnerability
of the unpatched server. In the following section we will show
how the end host malicious flow is blocked from exploiting
the Shellshock vulnerability on the unpatched web server.
Case 3: The ICS processes have a wide range of time-
related requirements, including very high speed, consistency,
regularity, and synchronization. Some systems may require
the computation to be performed as close to the sensor and
actuators as possible to reduce communication latency and
perform necessary control actions on time. It is important to
meet these time-related requirements when designing security
for the ICS. In our model, the CSSA provides a guaranteed
path between the specific sensors and actuators to meet the
time related requirements for the safe operation of control
systems.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We have used ONOS as the SDN Controller and Open Virtual
Switches to justify our CSSA. The machine we are using
for simulation is a Dell Power Edge M640 Server, consisting
of two Intel Xeon Gold 6126 @ 2.6 GHz processors and
384 GB(6x64) of RAM. We have used Oracle VM Box and
open virtual switches to create the network environment. Our
network configuration is shown in Figure 4.
We have developed the CSSA as an ONOS application
running over North Bound Interface. Several modules in
ONOS such as switch manager, module management, link
discovery and REST APIs are adapted from the Floodlight
Controller. The data model in ONOS is implemented using
Titan graph database, Cassandra key value store and the
Blueprints graph API to expose network state to applications.
Applications read the global network view to make forwarding
and policy decisions and write their policies to be enforced
on the network view.
Open vSwitch (aka) (OVS) is an open-source multilayer
virtual switch used for network virtualization. It helps to
establish control over distributed physical servers using
virtualised switching abstraction. It is implemented using
C. However, it can be adapted to various environments. It
supports and uses OpenFlow. It also supports other protocol
like NetFlow, and sFlow. In most cases, it is used in data
centres. It is supported by most Linux oriented virtualization
technologies including Xen/XenServer, KVM and Virtual
Box.
The Host 1 is RTU/PLC slave machine (172.56.16.20)
simulates the acquisition of parameters from 10 boiler water
tanks and a main tank, and one valve actuator controlled
from the PLC. The PLC node is simulated using the Modbus
PLC Simulator, installed on a Windows 10 virtual machine.
Host 2 (172.56.16.20) runs the SCADA MTU/PLC MASTER
which is based on a free version of Promotic PLC running on
a Microsoft Windows Virtual Machine. The MTU machine
also runs the SCADA HMI to visualize the process. The
web-server is based on DVWA, a XAMPP web-server
designed with vulnerabilities configurable with difficulty
from low to impossible which is hosted on linux OS and
vulnerable to shellshock. The kali linux machine is used for
generating attacks. Modbus-cli tool is used for reading and
writing values to the memory registers. Attackers can use
this tool to capture the data from the target any analyse the
data before performing the attack. For instance, attackers may
want to know which coil controls the pressure valve on the
system and what value that pressure value has in its register
that is the threshold for opening and closing it. If these values
are changed, the entire plant could be placed at risk.
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CSSA
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172.56.16.20
Fig. 4: Network Setup
1) Defending unpatched systems: There are an increasing
number of zero day attacks [5] each year. In general, it can take
several weeks for the patches to be released by the vendors
[6]. Furthermore, even after the patches have been made
available, an attacker may be able to exploit the vulnerabilities
in practice, as systems may not have been patched [7]; this is
a common occurrence in the real world.
With critical infrastructures such as SCADA systems, network
operators can be hesitant to apply the patches, as in some
cases this can require the systems to be taken offline; also
sometimes the operators can be worried that patching can
break the SCADA application. As long as the systems remain
unpatched, they are vulnerable to attacks. Our security solution
helps to protect such vulnerable systems by preventing the
malicious traffic at the switch that is near to the source of
attack.
In Figure 4, we have used a Kali Linux VM as the malicious
client VM to launch a Shellshock attack on an unpatched Web
Server VM. Figure 5a shows a successful Reverse Shellshock
attack on the vulnerable Web Server without our security
solution.
With our security solution, attack signatures shown in 5b are
applied at SW1 switch to prevent malicious client VMs from
targeting attacks on the unpatched web server. Then when we
launched the same attack on the Web Server VM, the attack
was not successful and the malicious VM is isolated from the
network. As shown in Figure 5c, the malicious VM1 lost its
connectivity.
In traditional networks, such attack detection and prevention
are performed at the destination host. With our security
solution, such attacks are detected and prevented nearer to
the source that is generating the malicious flow. This is a
significant advantage since it enables the resources at the des-
tination and the switches to be available for legitimate traffic.
That is, the impact of the attacks on the network resources and
bandwidth is reduced. Furthermore, the compromised end host
is isolated from the network to prevent further attacks on any
other host. The security administrators are able to carry out
offline analysis to determine how the attacker compromised the
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 5: Reverse Shellshock attack (a) Successful approach (b)
Attack Rule in XML specification and (c) Attack prevention
at Switch connected to malicious source
end host and take proper measures to update the system before
re-connecting it to the network. Table I presents the worst case
latency results for the varying number of rules used for traffic
validation using DPI.
We have presented the average worst-case results for 10 runs
for varying numbers of rules for a single flow. We reset the
system after each run to ensure that the rules are flushed out,
thereby preventing any caching of the rules. This is important
because if we use multiple flows, the flows can be either
dropped or forwarded when they match with any of the rules.
Therefore, even if we have 1000 rules and if the incoming
packet matches with the first rule, then we may not observe
any delays. Hence, we have provided the results for the case of
a single flow, which only matches with the last rule. To ensure
that the flow only matches the last rule, we have used deny
policies for all rules and used the permit only for the last rule.
Hence, even if the packet matched any of the earlier rules, it
will be dropped and we can detect the inconsistencies with the
TABLE I: Traffic Validation
Rules Delay
10 0.008s
50 0.0112s
100 0.0264s
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Fig. 6: Flow encryption-decryption time
rule matching. So the results represent the actual worst case
delays with our architecture components.
2) Flow Encryption and Decryption: We have added USB to
Ethernet converters to make switch ports. We extended the
LINC-Switch [8] to support encryption using crypto module.
We have used AES algorithm with key size 128 bits. Figure 6
shows the end to end delays caused due to the encryption
and decryption of the flows for variable data sizes for the case
scenario of 200 hosts connected to each edge switch with path
length of four. The results are shown for the cases of flow
without encryption without cross traffic, without encryption
with cross traffic, with encryption and decryption without
cross traffic and with encryption and decryption with cross
traffic. As shown in the figure, the encryption and decryption
of the flows incurs additional delays to the flow. The delay
also increases with the increase in the data size and for the
cases with cross traffic. However, these delays are applicable
for the cases where there is need for dynamic encryption of
flows such as legacy systems in critical infrastructures which
may not support any security functionality. Hence it is of
significant advantage for enhancing the security of the legacy
applications.
A. Performance
In this section, we will present some of the performance
results of CSSA running over ONOS. We have used CBench,
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an SDN controller benchmarking application to measure the
throughput. CBench works by creating a set of switches and
sending different types of traffic between the switches and
the Controller. We have measured the flow rate with and
without the CSSA for 20 switches where each switch is
connected to 10 end hosts and the number of flow rules in
the switches are increased from 100 flow rules to 400 flow
rules. Figure 7 shows the throughput with and without CSSA.
The orange bars shows the throughput obtained by activating
default applications such as the ONOS core, drivers, proxy
and the forwarding application. Blue bars show the throughput
of the Controller after activating CSSA together with the
previously mentioned applications. As shown in the Figure
7, the throughput decreases with the CSSA and it also varies
in accordance with the number of flow rules in the switches.
Typically the reduction in throughput is between 4% to 6%.
With the similar setup, we have used Jconsole to measure the
CPU usages and Heap memory usages while ONOS is working
with and without CSSA. Jconsole is a built-in API of JAVA
to monitor the individual JAVA modules running within the
JVM. Figure 8 shows the CPU usages, and Figure 9 shows
the Heap memory usages without and with CSSA for varying
number of flow rules. In both the cases, the overhead increases
with the increase in the number of flow rules in the switches.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this Section we will present some of the related work.
McLaughlin [9] presented a detailed study on the threat
landscape of ICS. Nawrocki [10] conducted a detailed study
on the security impact of connecting ICS to Internet. The
traffic analysis is correlated with data from honeypots and
Internet-wide scans to separate industrial from non-industrial
ICS traffic and the authors provide an in-depth view on
Internet-wide ICS communication and identified several
critical risks to the ICS and Internet. [11] proposed security
metric based on AND/OR graphs that represent cyber-physical
dependencies among network components. The proposed
metric is able to identify sets of critical cyberphysical
components, with minimal cost for an attacker to make
the control system into enter into a non-operational state.
Niedermaier [12] developed testbed for testing ICS against
specific attacks where an attacker has remote access to the
network and an attacker who has local access to the ICS
components with basic knowledge and [13], [14] proposed
anomaly detection techniques for ICS.
Currently SDN is increasingly being deployed in different
networks and there is ongoing work [15], [16], [17], [18]
for identifying different possible attacks in such networks
and developing techniques [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]
to deal with the attacks in SDN. Erokhin [25] presented
some preliminary study for using SDN to monitor the
critical information infrastructure. We have proposed a
software enabled architecture that is based on SDN and NFV
technologies. We have also described how our architecture
is able to address the specific security requirements of the
control systems.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed a software enabled security
architecture for securing control systems. Our security
architecture uses SDN technology to dynamic policy
driven decision making across the network infrastructure.
Such an approach enables dynamic isolation of control
system components and network devices that are vulnerable
to security attacks. The security architecture uses NFV
technology to provision dynamically security functions
at the required places in the network infrastructure
thereby enhancing the security capability of control system
components. We have used this combined SDN and NFV
technologies enabled security architecture to demonstrate how
it can be used to protect control systems from certain specific
attacks namely denial of service attacks, from unpatched
vulnerable control system components as well as securing
the communication flows from the legacy devices that do not
support any security functionality.
REFERENCES
[1] T. D. Nadeau and K. Gray, SDN: software defined networks. ” O’Reilly
Media, Inc.”, 2013.
[2] O. N. Foundation, “Software-defined networking: The new norm for
networks,” https://www.opennetworking.org/images/stories/downloads/
sdnresources/white-papers/wp-sdn-newnorm.pdf.
[3] B. Krebs, “Cyber incident blamed for nuclear power plant shutdown,”
Washington Post, June, vol. 5, p. 2008, 2008.
[4] K. Poulsen, “Slammer worm crashed ohio nuke plant network,”
http://www. securityfocus. com/news/6767, 2003.
[5] I. (2016), Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, accessed 18 Nov
2016.
[6] H. B. (2014), High-Tech Bridge Research: Web Application Security
Trends in 2013, accessed 14 June 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://www.technologyreview.com/web/21537/,
[7] J. Grossman, “How does your website security stack up against your
peers?” WhiteHat Security Website Statistics Report, no. 12, 2013.
[8] LINC-switch. https://github.com/FlowForwarding/LINC-Switch.
[9] S. McLaughlin, C. Konstantinou, X. Wang, L. Davi, A.-R. Sadeghi,
M. Maniatakos, and R. Karri, “The cybersecurity landscape in industrial
control systems,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 104, no. 5, pp. 1039–
1057, 2016.
[10] M. Nawrocki, T. C. Schmidt, and M. Wa¨hlisch, “Uncovering vulner-
able industrial control systems from the internet core,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1901.04411, 2019.
[11] M. Barre`re, C. Hankin, N. Nicolau, D. G. Eliades, and T. Parisini,
“Identifying security-critical cyber-physical components in industrial
control systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.04796, 2019.
[12] M. Niedermaier, A. von Bodisco, and D. Merli, “Cort: A communication
robustness testbed for industrial control system components,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1904.04286, 2019.
[13] D. Shalyga, P. Filonov, and A. Lavrentyev, “Anomaly detection for water
treatment system based on neural network with automatic architecture
optimization,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.07282, 2018.
[14] J. Kim, J.-H. Yun, and H. C. Kim, “Anomaly detection for industrial
control systems using sequence-to-sequence neural networks,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1911.04831, 2019.
[15] S. Sezer, S. Scott-Hayward, P. K. Chouhan, B. Fraser, D. Lake,
J. Finnegan, N. Viljoen, M. Miller, and N. Rao, “Are we ready for
sdn? implementation challenges for software-defined networks,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 36–43, 2013.
[16] S. Lee et al., “Delta: A security assessment framework for software-
defined networks,” in Proc. of NDSS, vol. 17, 2017.
[17] M. C. Dacier et al., “Security challenges and opportunities of software-
defined networking,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 96–100,
March 2017.
[18] E. Marin, N. Bucciol, and M. Conti, “An in-depth look into sdn topology
discovery mechanisms: Novel attacks and practical countermeasures,” in
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. ACM, 2019, pp. 1101–1114.
[19] W. Jiasi, W. Jian, L. Jia-Nan, and Z. Yue, “Secure software-defined
networking based on blockchain,” 2019.
[20] T. Park, Y. Kim, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, Z. Xu, K. Park, and S. Shin,
“Dpx: Data-plane extensions for sdn security service instantiation,” in
International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and
Vulnerability Assessment. Springer, 2019, pp. 415–437.
[21] S. Shin et al., “Rosemary: A robust, secure, and high-performance net-
work operating system,” in Proc. of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC conference
on computer and communications security. ACM, 2014, pp. 78–89.
[22] P. Porras et al., “A security enforcement kernel for openflow networks,”
in Proc. of the 1st workshop on Hot topics in software defined networks.
ACM, 2012, pp. 121–126.
[23] H. Li et al., “Byzantine-resilient secure software-defined networks
with multiple controllers,” in 2014 IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC). IEEE, 2014, pp. 695–700.
[24] P. Chaignon, K. Lazri, J. Franc¸ois, T. Delmas, and O. Festor, “Oko:
Extending open vswitch with stateful filters,” in Proceedings of the
Symposium on SDN Research. ACM, 2018, p. 13.
[25] S. Erokhin, A. Petukhov, and P. Pilyugin, “Critical information infras-
tructures monitoring based on software-defined networks,” in Proceed-
ings of the 24th Conference of Open Innovations Association FRUCT.
FRUCT Oy, 2019, p. 83.
